Run-time Detection and Countermeasures

Current work exploring hardware Trojan detection is concentrated around post fabrication testing of an IC. Test vectors are implemented to “activate” hardware Trojans during the post fabrication test phase. There is a high probability that the test vectors used and the areas of an IC tested are not sufficient to activate all hardware Trojans. Our work therefore is in the development of a real-time detection methodology that incorporates 1) sensory data from monitoring the noise on the power distribution network (or other side-channel monitoring such as temperature or EM emission), 2) data analysis using signal processing techniques to differentiate noise signatures generated by foreign circuits from standard PVT noise (process, voltage, temperature), 3) decision circuitry that based on the sensory data and ensuing analysis, determines the presence of a hardware Trojan, and 4) countermeasures to counteract the effects of the Trojan. My research group is examining the use of a distributed power delivery system that “turns-off” sections of a circuit that have been tampered with. The power delivery network must be partitioned in such a way that turning off any section of the IC will not hamper the overall functionality of the circuit. The high level goal of our research is to fundamentally change the way integrated circuits are secured by incorporating circuit techniques and methodologies to prevent, detect, and counteract hardware Trojans.